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Evidence and Knowledge

Clayton Littlejohn

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Abstract According to Williamson, your evidence consists of all and only what you know (E = K). According to his critics, it doesn't. While E = K calls for revision, the revisions it calls for are minor. E = K gets this much right. Only true propositions can constitute evidence and anything you know non-inferentially is part of your evidence. In this paper, I defend these two theses about evidence and its possession from Williamson's critics who think we should break more radically from E = K.

1 Introduction

According to Williamson, your evidence consists of all and only what you know:

E = K: S's evidence includes p iff S knows p.[1]

According to Williamson's critics, it doesn't.[2] They typically prefer views on which your evidence is constituted by the propositions that are the contents of your non- factive mental states. To give these views a name, let's say his critics typically prefer E = B to E = K. According to E = B, the conditions that distinguish cases of knowing from (justifiably, perhaps) believing or seeing from seeming to see are not among those that determine what evidence you have.[3] It's not what you know

1 Williamson (2000: 185).

2 For critical discussions of Williamson's view of evidence, see Comesaña and Kantin (2010), Conee and Feldman (2008), Dodd (2007), Fantl and McGrath (2009), Goldman (2009), Littlejohn (2010), Rizzieri (2010), Silins (2005), and Turri (2009).

3 On one version of E = B, our evidence will consist of those propositions that are the contents of non- factive experiential states. On another, our evidence will consist of those propositions we justifiably believe, say, on the basis of non-factive experiential states.

C. Littlejohn (&) University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX, USA e-mail: cmlittlejohn@yahoo.com

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that determines what evidence you have; rather, it's your non-factive mental states that determine what evidence you have.[4] Whereas E = K implies that you and your systematically deceived mental duplicate have different evidence, E = B can avoid these externalist implications and so avoid the difficulties thought to arise for Williamson. In this paper, I shall insert myself into this debate between Williamson and his critics to argue that Williamson is closer to getting things right than his critics are. To be sure, we should revise E = K. E = K needs tiny revisions. An externalist view on which your evidence consists of the true propositions you know non-inferentially avoids the objections to E = K we should avoid and is preferable to E = B.

In §1, I explain why E = K needs revision and defend some positive proposals about evidence and its possession in §2. Williamson and I agree that evidence consists of facts or true propositions. We agree that anything you know non- inferentially will be included in your evidence. We disagree on two points. He thinks your evidence includes what you know inferentially, but I do not. He thinks your evidence includes only what you know, but I do not. In §3, I shall address those who say that we should break more radically from E = K and say that false propositions can constitute evidence.

Because the notion of evidence is so slippery, it is hard to know how to test competing accounts of this notion. Here are some general guidelines I think most of us can agree should be followed. Some claims about evidence seem to be platitudes. If an account of evidence cannot accommodate some platitude, this is a mark against it. There are claims about the role evidence plays in inference, explanation, and the justification of belief we want our account of evidence to accommodate. If an account of evidence cannot accommodate some these claims, this is a mark against it. There are intuitions about evidence ascription that many of us share. If an account of evidence cannot accommodate intuitions about evidence ascription, this is a mark against it. It would be good if an account could accommodate the data without positing ambiguity. Simple accounts are preferable to complicated accounts that combine concepts in unnatural ways.

Let's start with some platitudes. It seems to be a platitude about evidence that a subject's evidence is what that subject has to go on in trying to arrive at a view.[5] I would go further and add that a subject's evidence is limited to those things that the subject can properly treat as reasons for belief without needing antecedent justified beliefs to justify treating these considerations as proper starting points for deliberation. It also seems to be a platitude about evidence that a piece of evidence is something that could serve as a reason (or partial reason) for belief in the sense that it can go towards explaining why the subject justifiably or rationally believes a proposition. The explanation is not (just) a psychological explanation that explains how the subject ended up in the mental states she's in, but an explanation as to how those states could have the normative properties that interest

4 Obviously, not every non-factive mental state determines what evidence you have. It doesn't seem that two subjects that differ in their desires thereby differ in what evidence they have. If you are so inclined, you can tack on some sort of reliability condition and say that only non-factive mental states produced by processes that reliably lead to truth provide evidence.

5 Kelly (2008: 943).

epistemologists.[6] These platitudes will not tell us which account of evidence is right when taken on their own, but it should give the reader some indication what the relevant notion of evidence is.

2 E=K According to E = K, evidence suffices for knowledge and knowledge suffices for evidence: ESK: If p is part of S's evidence, S knows p.

KSE: If S knows p, p is part of S's evidence.

In this section, we shall look at objections to both parts of E = K. Gettier cases cause various problems for ESK and cases of inferential knowledge cause problems for KSE. These problems do not arise for E = B, but they also do not arise for an externalist view that says that your evidence consists of true propositions you know non-inferentially or are non-inferentially justified in believing. I shall defend some positive claims about evidence later. Let's first look at the objections to ESK and KSE.

2.1 Evidence Without Knowledge

The first objection to ESK is that it clashes with what appears to be a platitude about evidence and access:

UA: S has (epistemically) unproblematic access to her evidence.

This captures the idea that if it is not proper for you to treat some proposition as a reason for forming beliefs because you do not have unproblematic access to the facts that determine whether this proposition is true, the proposition is something you might come to justifiably accept, but only after you find some more basic considerations to justify its acceptance. Until then, it cannot be part of your evidence for justifying further beliefs of yours.

What is it to have unproblematic access to your evidence? Silins has suggested that it is to have armchair access to your evidence:

AA: If p is part of S's evidence, it is possible for S to know that p is part of S's evidence from the armchair (i.e., to know that p is part of S's evidence in such a way that the belief that p is part of S's evidence does not depend upon experience for its justification).[7]

If this is right, E = K is in trouble. Assuming we have knowledge of the external world, we cannot accept both AA and E = K. Taken together, AA and E = K imply that anything you know can be known from the armchair alone. To see this, assume these two claims are true:

6 Silins (2005: 376). 7 Silins (2005: 381).

(1) (2)

S knows that E = K is true from the armchair.[8] S knows p on the basis of observation.

Now, consider:

(3) p is part of S's evidence. [(1), (2)] (4) If p is part of S's evidence, S could know that p is part of S's evidence from the armchair alone. [(AA)] (5) S knows that p is part of S's evidence from the armchair alone. [(3), (4)] (6) S knows from the armchair that if S knows that p is part of S's evidence from the armchair alone, p can be known to S from the armchair alone. [(1)] (7) S can know p from the armchair alone. [(5), (6), and K-Closure]

The result that anything you know can be known from the armchair is clearly intolerable. Among the things we know are propositions we have strong empirical justification for believing.[9] To avoid it, Silins encourages us to reject E = K. Owing to the factivity of knowledge, if E = K is false, so is (1).

He offers a second objection to E = K. Let's suppose: (8) S knows p on the basis of observation. Now, consider: (9) p is part of S's evidence. [(8), (KSE)] (10) S can know that p is part of S's evidence from the armchair alone. [(9), (AA)] (11) S can know that her belief that p constitutes knowledge from the armchair alone [(1), (10)] (12) S knows from the armchair that if her belief that p is true constitutes knowledge, her belief is not Gettiered. (13) S can know from the armchair alone that her belief that p is true is not Gettiered. [(11), (12), K-Closure]

Like Silins, I do not think that (13) is a consequence of (8). Fake barn detection isn't this easy. The processes we use to determine what evidence we have does not require or provide for us the evidence we need to know if our beliefs are Gettiered. To avoid the conclusion that any belief that constitutes observational knowledge is a belief we can know isn't Gettiered from the armchair, he thinks we should deny (11) and ESK.

Both objections assume AA. If UA really did support AA, we would have good reason to reject E = K. I do not think AA really captures the intuition that makes UA so appealing. To argue from UA to AA and then to the further claim that nothing we

8 E = KdoesnotimplythatE = KcanbeknownfromthearmchairE = KdoesnotimplythatE = K can be known. I do not think that anyone thinks that the way to deal with Silins' objection is to say that E = K isn't known or isn't known from the armchair.

9 Let's say that S's justification for believing p is strong empirical justification if it is impossible to have that very justification from the

armchair alone. S's justification for believing p is weak empirical justification if that very justification could have been had from the armchair alone but depends constitutively upon the subject's experiences.

know about the external world that we cannot know from the armchair could constitute evidence, we have to assume that we have only problematic access to the relevant truths about the external world. It seems deeply counterintuitive to say that the access we have to facts we know non-inferentially is epistemically problematic. (If the epistemic access you have to p is epistemically problematic, it seems you could not know p non-inferentially, you would need additional reasons to believe p so that your epistemic position with respect to p is not problematic.) It seems rather plausible that we can have non-inferential knowledge of the external world. So, it seems there should be some features of the external world we have unproblematic access to, such as those features we can know about directly via observation. The upshot seems to be that AA cannot receive significant support from the relatively uncontroversial claim that we enjoy unproblematic access to our evidence.

Perhaps UA supports something weaker than AA:

AE: If p is part of S's evidence, it is possible for S to know that p is part of S's evidence without needing any empirical justification for believing that p is part of S's evidence beyond the justification needed for p to be part of S's evidence.

One problem with AA was that it implied that the justification we have for second- order beliefs about our own evidence (e.g., the belief that p is part of our evidence) is independent from any strong empirical justification. This suggests that having this strong empirical justification will not be part of what determines what our evidence is.[10] To avoid these difficulties, we have to adopt a very restrictive account of evidence. We have to say that facts about the external world that we know non- inferentially are excluded from our evidence even though, intuitively, our access to these facts is not epistemically problematic. The idea behind the move from AA to AE is simple enough. AE allows that it is possible for you to possess p as part of your evidence even if this requires having strong empirical justification for believing p, a justification that might make access to p unproblematic. AE insists that you do not any strong empirical justification for believing that p is part of your evidence beyond whatever strong empirical justification is needed for p to get into your evidence. So, it denies that you need to check the world to find out what evidence you have once you have it and does not imply that access to the external world is always epistemically problematic.

If we replace AA with AE, the first of Silins' objections to E = K does not get off the ground. The second objection remains. Intuitively, it seems that more strong empirical justification is needed for justifiably believing that your belief in p is not Gettiered than is needed for p to be part of your evidence. So, Silins' second objection forces us to choose between KSE and ESK. Forced to choose but inclined

[10] To see this, remember that on AA, if p is part of your evidence, you are in a position to know that this is so from the armchair. Assume that you can know from the armchair whether you need strong empirical justification to have something in your evidence, the problem discussed above with E = K would arise anew. Combine (i) the claim that you can know from armchair that p is part of your evidence, (ii) that you can know from the armchair that you could not have p as part of your evidence unless you had strong empirical justification for believing p, and you get the unfortunate result that you can know things from the armchair that cannot be known from the armchair (e.g., that you have strong empirical justification for believing p).

to retain as much of E = K as possible, I would choose KSE over ESK. And, forced to choose between AE and ESK, I would choose AE. If we were to choose ESK over AE, we would have to say that while p is part of S's evidence, this fact does not put S in a position to know that p is part of S's evidence. S would need additional empirical evidence to know that her belief in p is not Gettiered. It takes a considerable amount of evidence to know that some particular belief is not Gettiered. It would require having evidence that p is true, evidence that this evidence does not lead to the truth accidentally, and evidence that there are no knowledge defeaters. Intuitively, knowing that something is part of your evidence does not require knowledge of these very complicated facts. If you can know p non- inferentially without being in a position to know whether your belief in p is Gettiered and your evidence is whatever it is that you have unproblematic access to that you can rightly reason from to further beliefs, doesn't it seem plausible that you have the necessary access to p for p to be part of your evidence if you know p non- inferentially? Won't you have the necessary access even if you do not have knowledge-level evidence for believing that your belief in p is not Gettiered?

The reader might not be convinced that AE is true and wonder if it wouldn't be better to hold onto ESK than AE. I don't think so. We do not need AE to cause trouble for ESK. Suppose a non-factive mental duplicate of yours sees a real barn, a barn that is qualitatively identical to the barn you know you saw on your drive through real barn country. Suppose this subject's barn is surrounded by a sufficient number of fakes so that this subject doesn't know the building that she saw was a barn. We can stipulate that her belief is true and reasonably held. It seems counterintuitive to say that she has less evidence than you just because of the fake barns. I can't think of

any principled reason to think that your evidence couldn't include the proposition that the building you saw was a barn, so it is tempting to say that your counterpart's evidence includes a proposition she doesn't know is true—that the building she saw was a barn. Also, it seems that the difference in what you two know is due to extra-evidential factors (e.g., the presence of fakes in her case and the absence of fakes in yours). This style of explanation is ruled out by ESK. ESK implies that if your counterpart's evidence includes the proposition that the building she saw was a barn, the subject would know that the building was a barn and so would not be in a Gettier case. So, ESK fails to accommodate intuition and rules out a plausible explanation of that intuition.

2.2 Knowledge Without Evidence

I don't think it follows from the fact that S knows p that p is part of S's evidence, but I do think that if S knows p non-inferentially, p part of S's evidence. In this section, I shall argue against KSE and defend in its place this weaker principle:

IKSE: If S knows p non-inferentially, S's evidence includes p.[11]

[11] Maher (1996) defends the view that our evidence includes what we know on the basis of observation and so I imagine he would be sympathetic to IKSE. Weatherson has expressed sympathy for a view in the neighborhood of this one, a view on which your evidence is what you know as the output of a Fodorian module. I don't know if this view has appeared in print.

Inference is not a process you use to gain new evidence. In inference you put your evidence to work to settle questions. This does not sit well with KSE. KSE implies that if you use some process to acquire knowledge, that process just is a process by which gain new evidence. This seems counterintuitive. S knows p non- inferentially. S deduces competently the disjunctive proposition that p or q. S then competently deduces that if *p, then q is true. As S adds more and more trivial consequences of p to her set beliefs, it is intuitive to say that she'll know things she did not know previously but it is not intuitive to say that she acquires new evidence each time she learns a new trivial consequence of p.

Someone could say that this seems intuitive only if we're working with a very narrow conception of evidence.[12] I admit that there is a perfectly good sense in which the known deductive consequences of propositions included in your evidence can serve as reasons for believing further propositions. For examples, see above. There is a perfectly good sense in which the disjunctive proposition, p or q, is a reason for me to believe the conditional proposition, if *p, then q. I know the disjunction, I know that the conditional is a consequence of the disjunction, and if I'm a logic novice, I might not be able to move directly from p to if *p then q without reasoning through the disjunction. So, there's a sense in which the disjunctive proposition is a reason for me to believe the conditional. So, am I working with an overly narrow conception of evidence?

I don't think so. Comfortably seated in my apartment, I read an article about foxes. It says that scientists observed that female foxes often ate berries and observed no male foxes that did likewise. Hundreds of foxes were examined carefully, all foxes were quite hungry, and that's what they saw. 'How fascinating,' I thought. I look out the window and see a fox in the yard. I see that it is eating blueberries off of the bush. I judge:

(1) There is a female fox in my yard.

I know (1) is true on the basis of inductive inference and observation. I know that all female foxes are vixens and so I deduce:

(2) There is a vixen in my yard.

There are two things about this case. First, since the grounds for believing (1) were inductive grounds, the evidential probability of (1) should be less than 1. Second, when I deduce (2) from (1), the evidential probability of (2) is not greater than (1) was prior to believing (2). We can stipulate that I do not have grounds for believing (2) independent from the grounds that support (1), so the evidential probability of (2) should also remain less than 1.

Both these things could be true if IKSE is true, but not if KSE is true. If (1) is something I know initially on inductive grounds, KSE says that (1) is part of my evidence, so I can deduce that (2) is true from propositions included in my evidence and then deduce that (*1) is inconsistent with my evidence. But, then it seems that the evidential probability of (1) is 1 even if I observe nothing new. Because it's an

[12] An anonymous referee raised this worry.

obvious logical consequence of a propositions included in my evidence (i.e., (1)), the evidential probability of (2) is 1. But, then it seems that since I know (2), KSE says that it is part of my evidence now. If I reason from (1) to (2) and back to (1), the evidential probability of my belief in (1) starts below 1 when initially formed and then increases to 1 when I deduce it from (2). The evidential probability of (1) could potentially increase if I were to acquire new evidence, but it shouldn't increase by reasoning from things that I deduce from (1) even if I come to know things by means of these deductive inferences that entail (1).[13]

So, I don't think you're necessarily working with an overly narrow conception of evidence you think it's a

mistake to say that your evidence includes things you know inferentially. If the evidential probabilities of the propositions we believe are determined by the evidence, it does not seem that among the propositions that we conditionalize on are propositions we know on inductive grounds.[14] Either we deny that we can know things on inductive grounds or we should say that there is a difference between acquiring new knowledge and acquiring new evidence. This is a difference without a difference according to KSE, not IKSE.

If we revise KSE to accommodate the intuition that a subject lacks entailing evidence for the deductive consequences what she knows on inductive grounds (e.g., that only vixens eat blueberries), we have to recognize a distinction between this subject's evidence and her derivative reasons for belief. Evidence and derivative reasons for belief do some of the same things. Both can play a part in rationalizing the formation of beliefs, for example. They differ in that the propositions that constitute her evidence fix evidential probabilities, the propositions that constitute derivative reasons for belief do not. Belief in the propositions that constitute derivative reasons for belief enable her to apply old evidence to form new beliefs without inserting their contents in her stockpile of evidence. So, these beliefs transmit support without generating new support or strengthening old support provided by the evidence.

[13] The argument is inspired by an argument of Dodd's (2007) that purports to show that E = K engenders scepticism. Williamson has resources for dealing with Dodd's objection. For discussion, see Littlejohn (2008).

[14] In the course of criticizing an account of evidence on which evidence is non-factive, Williamson notes that it is not clear how someone working with a non-factive conception of evidence could rule out the possibility of having bodies of evidence that include logically inconsistent propositions. For example, suppose you think there can be false, non-inferentially justified beliefs and you are tempted to identify a subject's evidence with the propositions that subject is non-inferentially justified in believing. Many have the intuition that it is possible to justifiably believe inconsistent propositions (provided that you do not appreciate that they are inconsistent), so it seems you would have to allow for the possibility that someone could have a body of evidence that includes two or more propositions that are inconsistent with one another. Williamson observes, ''there are grave difficulties in making sense of the evidential probabilities on inconsistent evidence, since conditional probabilities are usually taken to be undefined when conditioned on something inconsistent. In particular, any proposition has a probability 1 conditional on itself and any contradiction has probability 0 on anything ... but these constraints cannot both be met for probabilities conditional on a contradiction'' (2009: 310). We can add this to the list of reasons to think evidence is factive. I mention this here because it is clear textual evidence that Williamson takes evidence to be the thing that determines the evidential probabilities of what we believe. So, we should be able to rely on our intuitive sense of whether certain hypotheses are consistent with someone's evidence to determine what the elements of someone's body of evidence is. If, as is plausible, we think that we can know p on inductive grounds when the evidential probability of p on such grounds is less than 1, there is a problem for KSE.

Without belief in the propositions that constitute derivative reasons, our evidence could not rationalize beliefs upstream (e.g., deductive consequences of things known via induction).[15] With belief in these propositions, the evidential support provided to her inferential beliefs does not get any stronger.

Little is lost if we replace KSE with IKSE. I have said little to motivate IKSE, so let me explain why I think IKSE must be true. Consider a stronger principle:

IJSE: If S's belief that p is non-inferentially justified and p is a piece of evidence, p is included in S's evidence.

If knowledge requires justified belief, IKSE is a consequence of IJSE. In support of IJSE, Fantl and McGrath remark, ''If your justification for a proposition is good enough for knowledge, then if it isn't among your reasons for belief, it's not for shortcomings in your epistemic position with respect to it''.[16] They leave it open that something other than a weakness in your epistemic position might prevent p from being part of your evidence. It might be that p is not evidence, for example. I've added a proviso to take care of that. If p is not a bit of evidence but you are non- inferentially justified in believing p, IJSE does not say that p is part of your evidence. To show that IJSE is false, you would have to show that in spite of the fact that p is a bit of evidence and in spite of the fact that S's belief in p is non- inferentially justified, p is not part of S's evidence. Here's why I don't think arguments against IJSE will be persuasive. If we think of your evidence as what you have the right to reason from to justify further beliefs, cases that cause trouble for IJSE would be cases where it seems intuitive for us to say that while S's belief that p was justified it would be improper for S to treat p as a reason for forming any further beliefs because the relationship between S and p is epistemically problematic. If that problematic relation did not constitute a decisive reason to refrain from treating p as a reason for belief, it wouldn't threaten IJSE. If, however, the relation between S and p is epistemically problematic in such a way that there's a decisive epistemic reason for S to refrain from treating p as a reason for belief, that would seem to be just the sort of reason that would defeat the justification S had for believing p.[17] The intuitions that support this last point are precisely the sort of intuitions that lend support to closure principles for justification, principles that say that when the connection between p and q is sufficiently obvious to S, S will be in a sufficiently strong epistemic position to justifiably believe q if she justifiably believes p.

If this is an adequate motivation for IJSE, it should do the same for IKSE. If you think we can acquire evidence by means of direct observation, you should think that IKSE is true. Internalist and externalist about justified belief can endorse IKSE because IKSE it is consistent with two further assumptions internalists often defend

[15] To foreshadow just a bit, once we distinguish between the propositions that constitute evidence and the propositions that constitute derivative reasons for belief, we then have to say that if only justified beliefs provide reasons that justify further beliefs, not every justified

belief will be a belief whose content is part of a believer's stockpile of evidence.

16 Fantl and McGrath (2009: 98). 17 Williamson (2007b) defends the justification requirement for knowledge on these sorts of grounds.

that externalists need not deny. The first is that some sort of liberal foundationalism is true:

LF: Among the propositions that we know non-inferentially are e-propositions, propositions about the external world whose truth or falsity is not determined exclusively by facts about our non-factive mental states.[18]

The second is that this mentalist supervenience thesis is true: ESM: If two subjects are in the same non-factive mental states, p is part of the first subject's evidence iff p is part of the second subject's evidence.[19]

Supervenience internalists who say that we have the same evidence in the good case and bad can combine LF, ESM, and IKSE. There is nothing wrong with saying that subjects in the good case have e-propositions in their evidence provided that these propositions get into a subject's evidence in the bad case as well and nothing in these three claims rules that out. So, IKSE is consistent with a popular form of internalism.[20] IKSE is also consistent with the externalist views on which we have more evidence in the good case than the bad. So, IKSE seems like a relatively innocuous claim about the possession evidence.

3 It's Not the Thought That Counts

I argued in the previous section that p is part of your evidence if you know p non- inferentially. IKSE and IJSE tell us nothing about what constitutes evidence, they only tell us when bits of evidence get into bodies of evidence. In this section, I shall say something about what bits of evidence are. I shall argue for the factivity of evidence:

EST: If p is part of S's evidence, p is true.

I am proposing a sufficient condition for the possession evidence (IKSE) and a necessary condition for the constitution of evidence (EST), but I'm not offering necessary and sufficient conditions for 'p is part of S's evidence'. Someone who accepts EST and IKSE could say that your evidence is everything you know non-inferentially, but that might run into problems with Gettier intuitions. Instead, you might say that your evidence consists of all the truths that you are non-inferentially justified in believing. Williamson objects to this second view on the grounds, ''such

18 See Feldman (2004) and Pryor (2000).

19 For defenses of ESM, see Audi (2001), Conee and Feldman (2004), Pryor (2000), and Silins (2005).

20 You cannot combine ESM with IKSE if you also insist that evidence consists only of true propositions. If the truth of a proposition were required for that proposition to constitutive evidence, then we could not combine IKSE, ESM, and LF. According to LF, it is possible for someone to know an e-proposition non- inferentially. According to IKSE, if someone knows an e-proposition non-inferentially, this proposition is part of the subject's evidence. However, according to ESM, this proposition can be part of this subject's evidence only if it is part of any subject's body of evidence who happens to be a non-factive mental duplicate of our first subject. Among the possible non-factive mental duplicates of our subject are subjects that believe the very same e-proposition our first subject does when that proposition is false.

a view is a rather unnatural hybrid: the truth-condition is an ad hoc afterthought, not an organic consequence''.[21]

I don't feel the force of the objection. It's not obvious to me that we don't want a hybrid view, such a view might be precisely as unnatural as it should be. The account is supposed to tell us what evidence is and what it is to have it. If I gave you an account of what it is own a hedgehog and intended the account to explain what distinguishes hedgehog owners from cat owners, from hedgehog thieves, and from men sitting near wild hedgehogs, the account should be a hybrid. It should tell us something about what distinguishes hedgehogs from cats and owners from thieves and people who come across hedgehogs in the wild. You cannot complain that the account is a messy hybrid of moral and biological considerations. That is a feature, not a bug. EST is part of a non-normative story about what evidence is. Pieces of evidence are facts. IKSE and IJSE are part of a further (partially) normative story about what it is to have evidence. Having evidence, like having a hedgehog, is a messy and complicated affair and understanding it calls for a messy, hybrid account.

I'm not the first to offer arguments for EST. Williamson has argued for EST as well. Recently, he offered this argument:

Why is it bad for an assertion to be inconsistent with the evidence? A natural answer is: because then it is false. That answer assumes that evidence consists only of true propositions. For if an untrue proposition, p, is evidence, the proposition that p is untrue is true but inconsistent with the evidence.[22]

I'm sympathetic to the conclusion, but I'm not entirely persuaded by the argument. I imagine that someone who rejects EST would say that it is bad for an assertion to be inconsistent with the evidence (in part) because evidence is provided by our justified beliefs, beliefs that we are very confident are correct. If you assert p with the intention of persuading someone that p and that assertion is inconsistent with propositions they antecedently were justified in believing and are currently very confident are true, it will be difficult to persuade your audience

that p is true. This seems to be a plausible explanation as to why it is bad for an assertion to be inconsistent with the evidence your audience has and it does not assume EST.

Maybe this response to Williamson's argument does not work. I don't know what Williamson would say in response to the response. What I want to do here is bolster the case for EST by offering two independent arguments for it. The first appeals to linguistic intuitions. Reactions have been mixed. Most seem to share the relevant intuitions, but some doubt that EST is part of the best explanation of these intuitions. Rather than argue that EST provides the best possible explanation of the linguistic data, I will show that it provides an explanation of that data. Think of the first argument as a kind of explanatory challenge. If you think EST isn't true, find an explanation of the data that doesn't assume it. In the absence of one, I think we have some confirming evidence for EST. The second argument allows us to prescind

21 Williamson (2009: 311). This assumes, of course, that the truth of a belief is not a necessary condition for the justification of that belief.

22 Williamson (2007a: 209).

from linguistic considerations and focus on the role that evidence plays in explanatory inference. The question, 'Why do people weigh less dead than alive?' rests on a mistake. People don't lose weight when they die. When you know p is part of your evidence, you're in a position to know that if p is not some brute fact, the question, 'Why is it that p?' does not rest on this sort of mistake. Below, I turn these observations into an argument for EST.

3.1 Linguistic Considerations In this section, I shall present the linguistic evidence for EST. To begin, consider two brief

I. Scarlet: Green:

II. Scarlet: Green:

exchanges about an upcoming trial.

Does the prosecution have solid evidence against Mustard? The prosecution thinks it does. Here's the evidence they have: that he was the last one to see the victim alive, that he lied about his whereabouts on the night of the crime, that his fingerprints were on the murder weapon, and that he wrote a letter containing details the police think only the killer could have known. Of course, Mustard wasn't the last person to see him alive, he didn't lie about his whereabouts, and his fingerprints weren't on the murder weapon.

Does the prosecution have solid evidence against Mustard? People seem to think they do. Here's the evidence they have: that he was the last one to see the victim alive, that he lied about his whereabouts on the night of the crime, that his fingerprints were on the murder weapon, and that he wrote a letter containing details the police think only the killer could have known. That being said, I don't know if he's the last one who saw the victim alive, I don't know if he lied, I don't know if his fingerprints were on the murder weapon, and I don't know if he wrote a letter containing any details about the crime.

It seems that in (I) Green contradicts himself by asserting that the prosecution's evidence includes propositions he then asserts are false. If EST is true, his remarks seem contradictory because they are contradictory. He contradicts himself. It seems contradictory to say, 'Although p is part of the prosecution's evidence, *p', it seems contradictory to say, 'Although the prosecution knows p, *p', and these both seem contradictory because both knowledge and evidence ascriptions are factive.

Of course, some remarks seem contradictory even though they aren't contradic- tions. Moorean absurd assertions are like this. Is it possible that Green's remarks in (I) are like Moorean absurd assertions in this respect?23 I don't think so. Here it's helpful to look at both (I) and (II). In (II), Green's remarks seem contradictory in the way that Moorean absurd assertions are and I shall argue that this supports EST. So, if you want to try to undermine the evidence I say (I) provides for EST by saying

23 I owe the objection to an anonymous referee.

that Green's remarks merely seem contradictory for the sort of reasons that Moorean absurd assertions are, you cannot block the argument for EST because Green's remarks in (II) should not seem contradictory unless EST is true.

Consider:

(1) (2) (3) (4)

p but I do not believe p [omissive Moorean absurdity]. Although *p, the prosecution is justified in believing p. p is part of the prosecution's evidence, but *p [commissive]. p is part of the prosecution's evidence, but I don't believe p [omissive].

Those who deny EST are likely to prefer a view on which a subject's evidence is constituted by the propositional contents of some of the subject's non-factive mental states so would likely think that (2) and (3) are roughly

equivalent. The problem is that (2) is not defective, but (3) is. So, those who deny EST need to explain why (3) is defective when (2) is perfectly felicitous. Someone could deny EST and deny that (2) and (3) are roughly equivalent, but presumably someone who denies EST should agree that (1)–(4) could be true. We know that (1) is defective, but the proposition it expresses could be true. If someone can be justified in believing a false proposition, the prosecution can. According to those who deny EST, although (3) and (4) seem contradictory, it is not because it expresses a contradiction. These claims seem contradictory for the same reason (1) does and nobody thinks the defects of (1) constitute evidence that truth entails belief.

On a standard story about (1), (1) seems defective because the speaker who asserts it expresses a commitment to the truth of p while disavowing any such commitment. Notice that if you offer a similar account of (3) and (4), you have to say that the speaker who asserts (3) expresses a commitment to p that the speaker disavows by asserting p's negation. Now we can see the problem for those who deny EST—the only credible explanation as to how someone who asserts (3) expresses a commitment to p assumes EST. If EST isn't true, why would the speaker express a commitment to p by expressing the belief that p is part of someone else's evidence? Similarly, in (4), the speaker says that p is part of the prosecution's evidence and then asserts that she doesn't know if p. Treating (4) along the lines of (1) requires us to say that the speaker is committed to the truth of p. Again, this explanation assumes EST and so does not subvert the linguistic argument for it.

In response, someone might say that some rule of assertion could explain why (3) and (4) are defective.[24] I do not think this will undercut the argument for EST, either. Suppose the kind of rule we're considering is a rule that determines if an assertion is warranted. On the explanation we're considering, Green lacks adequate warrant for asserting (3) and (4). If (3) and (4) are true, why can't we have sufficient warrant for asserting them? Plausibly, knowledge is sufficient to warrant assertion. If you think Green does not have adequate warrant to assert (3) and (4), we should want to know why Green could not know that (3) or (4) are true. It cannot be that (3) and (4) cannot be true, that assumes EST. It cannot be that Green's lacks adequate justification for believing (3) and (4). If EST is false and Green knows both what the

[24] Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this possibility.

prosecution's case is and facts that they are unaware of, he should be able to have adequate justification for believing these things. I don't think Gettier cases always pop up when someone who believes (3) or (4) correctly and with justification.

Instead, the idea might be that asserting (3) or (4) violates some Gricean maxim. Someone could say that the speaker who asserts, 'The prosecution's evidence includes p' implies that she accepts p. So, by asserting this and failing to add that she herself believes *p or does not know whether p, the speaker generates the false implicature that she accepts p. Could this explain why (3) and (4) seem contradictory? They seem contradictory because the speaker implies that she accepts p but then disavows this commitment.

The problem with this suggestion is that we are trying to explain why (3) and (4) seem contradictory. Suppose the speaker asserts, 'The prosecution's evidence includes p' does conversationally imply that p or that she herself accepts p. If this is conversational implication rather than entailment, this implication should be cancellable. If you try to cancel it by asserting that *p or clarifying that you don't know if p is true, that is what generates the apparent contradiction. (3) and (4) would be felicitous if the implication were cancellable. An account that predicts that (3) and (4) should be felicitous cannot explain why they seem defective. So, I don't yet see any explanation of the linguistic data that doesn't assume EST.

3.2 Evidence and Explanation

Here, I want to offer a second argument for EST, an argument that focuses on the role that evidence plays in explanatory inference. We gather some evidence, p. After considering the possible explanations, we judge that it is q that best explains the evidence, p. At this point, if we know q is the best explanation, we are also in a position to judge knowingly that it is because of q that p. (We shall assume that inference to best explanation can generate knowledge.) If we know that p is part of our evidence, it is not by some further step of reasoning that we come to know that p can figure in inferences like inference to the best explanation. If we know that p is true because q, we know that both p and q are true. This is because 'p because q' is factive in the explanans and explanandum positions. (Of course, we could gather a bit of evidence, p, and it could be that p is a brute fact. We know that if p is a brute fact, p is a fact.) So, now we have a second argument for EST. When you know that p is part of your evidence, you are in a position to know a disjunction that has p as a consequence because both disjuncts have p as a consequence. When you know that p is part of your evidence, you know that either (i) there is no explanation as to why p and so know p is a brute fact or (ii) there is some explanation or other as to why p, in which case you know there is some proposition, q, such that 'p because q' is true. You know that p is true if p is a brute fact or a fact explained by something else.[25]

[25] Strictly speaking, it does not follow from the (alleged) fact that 'S knows p is part of S's evidence' entails p that 'S's evidence includes p' entails p. It could be that p can be evidence even if *p, but p can only be known to be included in a body of evidence by someone who knows p

is true. I cannot imagine any credible explanation as to why this would be. If p need not be true to be a piece of evidence, why would the falsity of p prevent you from knowing that p is part of someone's evidence? If p is a piece of

We can also run an argument for EST by focusing on normative explanations rather than non-normative explanations. These normative explanations are expla- nations of normative facts. They involve explanatory claims of the form 'You shouldn't believe p because q'.[26] Someone sympathetic to an evidentialist treatment of the epistemic 'ought' would likely think that when we gather evidence that strongly disconfirms some proposition, we can say things like, 'You shouldn't think that the intruder forced his way in because the window was broken from the inside'. Here, we cite a piece of evidence (i.e., that the window was broken from the inside) to explain why it is that a proposition shouldn't be believed. This explanatory claim, if true, entails that the subject shouldn't believe that the intruder forced his way in and that the window was broken from the inside. So, owing to the factivity of 'because' statements, someone sympathetic to evidentialist views on which facts about evidence are what explain facts about the normative status of various beliefs should be sympathetic to EST.

These arguments cause serious trouble for E = B. The arguments for EST and IKSE seem to show that your evidence can outstrip the evidence your non-factive mental duplicates have on the plausible assumption that LF is true. If e-propositions that are (part of) the content of our perceptual experiences find their way into our evidence, we should reject the mentalist conception of evidence on which facts about our evidence strongly supervene upon facts about our non-factive mental states.

An account that incorporates EST and IJSE but rejects ESK and KSE doesn't face the objections to E = K we considered in §1. On the view that identifies your evidence with the true propositions you are non-inferentially justified in believing, Gettier conditions aren't among the conditions that determine what evidence you have. The view does not imply that knowing p or knowing that p is part of your evidence requires being in a position to know if your belief in p is Gettiered. The view does not imply that propositions you deduce are true from propositions you know on inductive grounds have the evidential probability of 1. The differences between this view and E = K are relatively small. One of the aims of this paper is to show that you only need to make minor modifications to E = K to deal with the objections that have surfaced in the literature. So far, we've seen little reason to accept E = B and good reason to reject it.

4 Objections

In recent discussions of E = K, critics have argued that we ought to reject E = K on the grounds that it entails EST. Having defended EST in the previous section, I should address these objections.

Footnote 25 continued evidence that no one could know belongs to someone's evidence, is p really a central, important case? Remember, a standard view about evidence is that if you have it, you are in a pretty good position to know that you do.

[26] If talk of epistemic 'should' or 'ought' worries you, the points I am about to make could just as easily be made by focusing on claims about what is 'good' or 'bad' to believe.

If E = K were true, the following principle would be true as well:

E = K1: The proposition that p justified S in believing q only if S knows p.

Owing to the factivity of knowledge, E = K1 implies EST. Owing to the consequences of EST, we are encouraged to reject E = K1 and E = K. Here, we shall focus on two objections to EST. The first is that it implies that Gettier cases are impossible. The second is that it is incompatible with an attractive closure principle for justified belief. Both objections rest on a mistaken assumption about the relationship between evidence and justified belief.

4.1 Gettier Cases

Comesaña and Kantin ask us to consider one of Gettier's examples, Coins:

Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:

d. Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails:

e. The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true. But imagine, further, that unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the

man who will get the job.[27]

This is one of Gettier's original cases, but is it a Gettier case? It is if it is a case where (e) is true, Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true, but Smith does not know that (e) is true.

Comesaña and Kantin argue that anyone who accepts E = K1 has to deny that Coins is a Gettier case:

[27] Gettier (1963: 122).

(1) (2)

(3)

According to E = K1, no false propositions can constitute evidence. If no false propositions can constitute evidence, Coins is not a genuine Gettier case.[28] However, Coins is a Gettier case.

(C1) There are false propositions can constitute evidence. (C2) We must reject E = K1 and EST.

The argument's crucial premise is (2). In its defense, they say:

Now, everyone should agree that the proposition that Jones has ten coins in his pocket is something Smith knows, and that is part of what justifies Smith in believing that whoever got the job has ten coins in his pocket. Everyone should also agree that the proposition that the secretary said that Jones got the job is something that you know ... and it certainly plays some role in justifying Smith in believing that whoever got the job has ten coins in his pocket. But for this strategy to work, it should be the case that everything that justifies you in believing that whoever got the job has ten coins in his pocket is a proposition that you know. E = K1 is the claim that a proposition p cannot be part of your justification for believing something unless you know that p ... And there is no argument that we can think of to the effect that Smith's belief that Jones got the job plays no part whatsoever in justifying Smith in thinking that whoever got the job has ten coins in his pocket.[29]

Williamson does say, ''in any possible situation in which one believes a proposition p, that belief is justified, if at all, by propositions q1, ..., qn ... which one knows.''[30] This might suggest that insofar as Smith's belief in (d) is mistaken, Smith's evidence cannot include the proposition that (d) is true. So, it might seem that E = K1 implies that Smith's belief in (d) is not part of what justifies Smith in believing (e).

This is not how Williamson describes Gettier cases.[31] In subjecting audiences to real life Gettier cases of his own design, he describes his subjects as believing justifiably false propositions on the basis of his testimony, testimony that consists entirely of lies. When the subjects deduce a true belief from the false, justified belief that is well supported by the evidence he's given them, he says they have justified beliefs that fail to constitute knowledge. Is he entitled to describe the case in this way?

I think he is. If I might respond on his behalf, there are three things to say in response to Comesaña and Kantin's objection to E = K1 and EST. First, we need to distinguish between two objections. The first is that EST is incompatible with the existence of Gettier cases. The second is that EST incompatible with (3). The second objection is serious, but it is not nearly as serious as the first. It's one thing to

[28] Dreher (1974: 435) thinks that false propositions cannot constitute evidence, but thinks that Gettier cases are nevertheless genuine counterexamples to the JTB analysis. Shope (1983: 82) agrees.

[29] Comesaña and Kantin (2010: 450). [30] Williamson (2000: 185). [31] Williamson (2007a: 192).

say that a putative Gettier case isn't genuine and another to say that there's no such thing as a genuine Gettier case. Luckily, the first objection is easily dealt with. Early in the post-Gettier literature, some claimed that Gettier's cases weren't genuine. Skeptics thought that Smith could not justifiably believe (e) because the reasoning that led Smith to believe (e) relied essentially on a falsehood (i.e., that (d) is the case).[32] Feldman showed that it is possible to construct no false lemma cases (i.e., cases in which a subject is justified in believing p to be the case, p is the case, but the subject fails to knows that p is the case even though none of the subject's beliefs are mistaken).[33] Such cases show that there is no reason to take EST to be incompatible with the existence of Gettier cases as such.

Second, Comesaña and Kantin's objection has rhetorical force because it makes it seem as if those who accept EST deny the obvious. It is obvious that there are Gettier cases and Coins looks like a good one. While I'm relatively confident that (3) is true, I think my confidence in (3) would decrease if I were convinced that Comesaña and Kantin were right about what it takes for Coins to be a Gettier case. To believe with a high degree of confidence that they are right about what it takes for Coins to be a Gettier case and that Coins is a Gettier case, I have to believe with a high degree of confidence that EST is false and that there is a way of dealing with the evidence that seems to support it. Since I have little confidence in the conjunction of (2) and (3), I have little confidence in their objection to EST and E = K1.

Of course, Coins still presents a problem for E = K1 because this is a case where the subject reasons from a false belief in (d) to a further belief in (e) and the worry is that E = K1 implies the false belief in (d) cannot justify believing (e), in which case Coins doesn't meet the conditions necessary for it to be a genuine Gettier case.

I quoted the original text in its entirety so that the reader saw that Gettier describes the case as one in which Smith's evidence for (d) consists entirely of true propositions. There is nothing in Gettier's article that suggests that he thinks (2) is true. Nevertheless, we know why Comesaña and Kantin think that (2) is true. If E = K1 and EST are true, they claim, ''it should be the case that everything that justifies [Smith] in believing that whoever got the job has ten coins in his pocket'' is

32 Pappas and Swain thought that it was plausible to maintain, ''If an essential part of the reasoning from the evidence to the accepted proposition, h, proceeds through a false step, then acceptance of h is not justified'' (1978: 15). Lowy (1978) saw that this principle is no obstacle to the construction of Gettier cases. She argued that Gettier was focused on believers who are justified in believing propositions rather beliefs that are justified. If, as she suggests, ascriptions of personal justification ('S is justified in believing p') do not entail ascriptions of doxastic justification ('S's belief that p is justified'), someone could hold that you cannot justifiably believe p if that belief is based on reasoning that proceeds through a false step but could have a person justified in believing things having reasoned from false beliefs. In this paper, I have not been careful to mark the distinction between personal and doxastic justification. In Littlejohn (2009), I argue that we ought to recognize this distinction and show that it is useful for reconciling externalism accounts of justified belief with intuitions that some say favor internalism. My own view is someone can be justified in believing false propositions but there cannot be false, justified beliefs. Again, see Lowy's paper for an explanation as to how someone could say that there cannot be false, justified beliefs but can be Gettier cases.

33 See Feldman (1974).

known to Smith to be the case.[34] Since the false belief in (d) plays a role in Smith's acquisition of the justified belief in (e), it seems E = K1 and EST are mistaken.

To understand why this objection fails, we need to understand the different roles that Smith's beliefs and his evidence play in the justification of his beliefs. As Comesaña and Kantin acknowledge, the evidence that led Smith to form the false belief in (d) consisted entirely of true propositions. Given EST, we cannot say that (d) is evidence that goes towards justifying Smith's belief in (e), but I see no reason to deny that Smith's false belief in (d) plays some role in justifying his belief in (e). We saw earlier that a belief can play a role in helping someone to acquire new justified beliefs even if that belief's content is not part of the subject's evidence. Think back to our case from earlier of inductive knowledge and knowledge of the deductive consequences of such knowledge. A subject believes something on inductive grounds and then deduces that an obvious consequence of that proposition is true. Intuitively, the belief known on the basis of inductive grounds plays a role in justifying further beliefs even though the proposition believed on inductive grounds never itself becomes part of the evidence. If S's justified belief that p is the case can serve as the basis for justifiably believing q even if p is not part of S's evidence (as we saw happens when someone believes that the fox eating blueberries is female on inductive grounds and deduces that the fox eating berries is a vixen), this could happen in Coins as well. If he didn't believe (d), it isn't clear how the Smith would connect the evidence available to justify believing (e) but by connecting (d) to (e), he transmits the evidential support that supports believing (d) to support believing (e). There are differences between Coins and the cases discussed earlier, to be sure. There is this similarity. Prior to believing (d), (*d) is consistent with Smith's evidence. We know this is so because we know that (d) is false and the evidence for believing (d) consists of true propositions. Is the hypothesis that (*e) consistent with Smith's evidence? It is prior to believing (d). The only evidence Smith has for believing (e) at this stage is the evidence he has for believing (d), evidence entails neither (d) nor (e). So, if you're going to say that (d) is part of the evidence for (e), you'll have to say that after Smith comes to believe (d), Smith has entailing evidence for believing (e) in spite of the fact that the evidence he had prior to believing (d) entailed neither (d) nor (e). This doesn't strike me as a plausible interpretation of the case. It seems more plausible that the hypothesis that (*d) and the hypothesis that (*e) are consistent with Smith's evidence throughout the story (i.e., the evidential probabilities of (d) and (e) remain less than 1 throughout) even if these propositions at various points are inconsistent with what Smith justifiably believes.

If there is some principled reason to reject my response to Comesaña and Kantin's objection, it has to be that the following principle is true:

JE: The belief that p is part of what justifies S in believing that q only if p is included in S's evidence.

Why? The objection was intended as an objection to E = K1 because of the (alleged) connection between E = K1 and EST. The thought was that if EST were

34 Comesaña and Kantin (2010: 5).

true, false propositions could not constitute evidence, and so beliefs in false propositions based on evidence could not transmit justification to further beliefs by means of inference. Thus, Gettier cases like Coins would not be a counterexample to the JTB analysis of knowledge. If we were to deny JE, there would be no objection E = K1 and no objection to EST. Because JE is mistaken, the objection fails.[35]

We should reject JE because it is incompatible with a kind of fallibilism about justification:

F: S can justifiably believe p even if the evidential probability of p for S is less than 1.[36]

The problem with denying fallibilism so understood is that many of the things we know about the external world,

we know on inductive grounds. We cannot have such knowledge unless F is true. Knowing p requires justifiably believing p, and so it follows from the denial of F that knowing p requires an evidential probability of p of 1. We cannot have that in the case of inductive knowledge. So, infallibilism engenders a kind of scepticism.

Not only is this kind of scepticism an inherently unattractive position, the sceptic who denies F denies that Coins is a genuine Gettier case. Remember, Coins is a Gettier case only if Smith's belief in (d) is justified. That belief is based on fallible grounds, it is false but the evidence that supports it consists entirely of true propositions, and so if you deny F, you have to deny that Smith justifiably believes (d). You cannot object to E = K1 and EST on the grounds that these theses imply that Coins is not a Gettier case if your objection assumes JE and JE implies that Coins is not a Gettier case on its own. If (3) is true, JE is false. If (3) is false, Comesaña and Kantin's objection fails. If JE is true, (2) is false. If (2) is false, the objection fails.

4.2 Justification and Closure

Comesaña and Kantin offer a second objection to E = K1, which is that it is incompatible with this closure principle:

JC: If S is justified in believing that p and S competently deduces that q from p, thereby coming to believe q, without ceasing to be justified in believing p, then S is justified in believing q.

They argue as follows:

According to E = K1, a belief that p can justify S in believing something only if S knows that p. But let is suppose that S is justified in believing that p but doesn't know that p ... If that is so, then S is not justified in believing that q even if she is justified in believing (indeed, even if she knows) that p entails q and deduces that q on this basis without ceasing to be justified in believing

[35] [36] That is to say, S can justifiably believe p even if the epistemic probability of p (i.e., the conditional

For further objections to JE, see Neta (2008: 102). probability of p on S's evidence) is less than 1.

that p—for S's evidence for q is p, and S doesn't know p. Therefore, if E = K1 is true, then closure fails.[37]

Remember that E = K1 is a claim about evidence and justification, not beliefs and the way that beliefs transmit justification. E = K1 commits us to saying that false propositions cannot be evidence, not that false beliefs cannot help us acquire new justified beliefs by transmitting evidence that support other beliefs to support new ones. Even if E = K1 is true, there can be false, justified beliefs supported by inductive grounds consisting of true propositions. Suppose that the fox eating the blueberries happened to be the first male fox ever seen eating a berry. If the subject knew that of the hundreds of observed foxes prior to this event no male fox had eaten a berry then inferred justifiably that (i) the same is true of the fox seen now and then inferred (ii) that the fox seen now is a vixen, the belief in (ii) is as well supported as belief in (i) and no better supported if the only evidence the subject has for believing (ii) is the evidence that supports (i). If you say that the proposition believed in believing (i) becomes part of the subject's evidence for believing (ii), you would have to say that (*ii) is inconsistent with the subject's evidence. That cannot be true since that the subject's belief is inferred from a merely inductively justified belief.

Neither E = K1 nor EST commits us to denying JC unless we assume JE. But, as we saw, JE is incompatible with the sort of fallibilist assumptions that we need to say that we can be justified on the basis of fallible but good inductive grounds. We can say that what is believed when S falsely believes p does not provide the evidence necessary for justified belief in q, even if whenever S's belief that p is true is justified there is sufficient evidence for the justified acceptance of the obvious consequences of that belief. Competent deduction allows you to apply the evidence that supports the false belief in p to beliefs known to be consequences of that belief. The evidence sufficient for justifying the belief that p should suffice to justify the known consequences of that belief without the proposition that p adding to the evidence for believing the known consequences of p.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that the right account of evidence will deviate from E = K, but the differences between the right account and E = K will be minor. There are things we know that do not belong to our evidence (e.g., the things we know by means of inductive inference and subsequent inferences). There are things that belong to our evidence that we do not know (e.g., true propositions we do not know for purely Gettierish reasons). We can remain firmly committed to an externalist account of evidence, one that identifies evidence with true propositions we know about the external world on the basis of observation. I did not settle on a final view in this paper, but an attractive view that is consistent with everything I've argued for in this paper says that your evidence consists of the true propositions you are non-inferentially justified in believing.

[37] Comesaña and Kantin (2010: 8).

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